Skip to main content

The Crusades: the World's Debate

The struggle between Christendom and Islam that shaped the fate of Europe

| 36 min read | Hilaire Belloc | Excerpts

Table of Contents

Preface#

There are a score of ways in which a man may treat of the Crusades. They were, in their entirety, a continuous struggle between our civilisation and the hostile world of Islam, which all but overwhelmed Europe. The contrast, in its vividness, has struck all minds in any degree awake to the past. The colour and the drama of medieval warfare fill the story. Or, again one may speak of the Crusades in their deepest aspect as the conflict between Christendom and that undying Anti-Christ which desires to kill Christendom. One may regard the Crusades (and that is the commonest fashion) as subject for romance; it is in this aspect that they have been introduced to the world that reads English and mainly so introduced by the genius of Sir Walter Scott in his excellent novel (and grotesquely unhistorical work) The Talisman. Or, again, one may make the Crusades a text for exemplifying the strength and weakness of the Gallic temperament; or, again, a text for exemplifying the permanence, the exaltation, and the vices of Islam.

I: The World’s Debate#

Introduction#

Human affairs are decided through conflict of ideas, which often resolve themselves by conflict under arms. To understand those decisions under arms which determine in succession the fate of the world, three things should occupy the mind: first, the nature of the issue and its launching, that is, the occasion of its coming to battle; second, the military character of the opposing forces; third, the strategy and tactics of the campaigns.

It is proposed in this book to deal with that major conflict under arms between Christendom and Islam which took the form of the First or Great Crusade: its triumph, the exhaustion of the result it had achieved, and the final catastrophe of an episode of victory and defeat covering the very long lifetime of a man—eighty-eight years. Gibbon, in a phrase as concise as any of his packed sentences and far more exact than most of them (for he was ignorant of the religious temper he attempted to judge), called this major episode in our history, “The World’s Debate.”

Christianity In Peril#

Then again, the military character of the opposing forces in these great duels of history means much more than the nature of their armament and of the personnel which waged the war on either side. To understand the military character of any large event in war, one must consider race, climate, economic circumstance, and all that properly enters the mind of a competent military leader engaged in battle, short or prolonged, against another. One must consider the ground, the possibility of defence and its nature, and all the circumstances that make for triumph or disaster.

The last title, the strategy and tactics of the particular campaigns, is more definite and narrower than either of the first two; yet that also needs some expansion. The strategy on either side is never fully planned, the part played by accident must be remembered, and the constant sudden surprising alliance between genius and good fortune, as also, for that matter, between good fortune and incompetence.

All this we shall observe during that living story through the course of which our fathers all but re-established the spiritual mastery of Europe over the East: all but recovered the full patrimony of Rome.

That story must not be neglected by any modern, who may think, in error, that the East has finally fallen before the West, that Islam is now enslaved—to our political and economic power at any rate if not to our philosophy. It is not so. Islam essentially survives, and Islam would not have survived had the Crusade made good its hold upon the essential point of Damascus.

Islam survives. Its religion is intact; therefore its material strength may return. Our religion is in peril and who can be confident in the continued skill, let alone the continued obedience, of those who make and work our machines?

II: The Issue#

Simplicity of Islam#

One Mohammed had preached in desert Arabia (outside the effective boundaries of the Empire) a powerful new heresy, to which he and his eager followers converted by force and zeal the pagan Arabs and which was to prove violently attractive to great masses of the Eastern population. This new movement was, on its religious side, an intense simplification of the Catholic body of doctrine, eliminating nearly all that had seemed difficult to the untrained masses: the Trinity, the Incarnation, above all the mysterious Sacrament, and therefore the priesthood. On the political side it got rid of the burden of debt, the shame and suffering of slavery, the toils of an elaborate legal system and the lawyers who battened on it. It also ministered to the jealousy felt by outlying parts for the despotic central power at Constantinople. The message of Mohammed promised easy thinking on the religious side, freedom on the political; freedom not only to the individual but to local groups—the Egyptians, for instance. The individual was relieved from his debts and from legal constraint; the social groups from their domination by a distant imperial government with its arbitrary rule and its heavy weight of taxation.

The new creed came to be called Islam, that is, “The Acceptation,” and has retained that name. Those who followed it were the “True Believers.” We call them also, from the name of the great heresiarch who launched their effort, “Mohammedans.” We also talk of the culture they founded as the “Moslem” world.

Not long after Mohammed’s death, in A.D. 634, his Arab followers broke forth, a swarm of eager desert cavalry sweeping northward and making converts wherever it passed. Those who joined it, if they were slaves or debtors, recovered their freedom and could henceforward boast their independence of the imperial government. They were the more enthusiastic for their new creed because it seemed to them so simple of comprehension after the Christian affair of sacrifice and renunciation and difficult strain: its hierarchy of priests and its mysteries. The new enthusiasm, sweeping the Oriental world much as Communism proposes to sweep the ‘Western world today, enthusiastically preached one God. It revered Jesus Christ as the greatest of the prophets but rejected the complication of the Trinity. It revered our Lady highly—far the highest among women, but not the Mother of God. It offered comprehensive worship to the Deity, but it swept away the Mass with its Communion and all the rest. It had hardly a ritual; only prayers that all could follow, and a social system which men could easily adopt and find just.

Within a century of the first change, the soldiery of this new thing, Islam, had mastered and garrisoned and were governing Syria, North Africa, and much the most of Spain. They had even for a moment thrust into the heart of France, whence they were thrown back to the Pyrenees. They had thus dismembered the Roman Empire of the East and had overrun North Africa and Spainin the West. There remained, of course, in the countries they thus garrisoned and held, a great number (for generations a large majority) of subject orthodox Christians; but these pretended to no political power. They paid tribute to their Arabian masters and those of their own fellows who in great numbers had joined themselves to these new Arabian masters. Through these Christians and renegades the old culture went on, for they could build and they could write and calculate and do all that had been done by civilised men. But political power was in the hands of the Moslemsoldiery andtheir chiefs.

Islam mastered not only Syria and Egypt and North Africa and most of Spain but rapidly extended itself eastward, seizing the very fertile plain and wealth of Mesopotamia, flooding with its religion and arms Persia and the tangle of mountains on the borders of India and up into the steppes of Asia; and here it was, on this Asiatic border (which Western soldiers had visited after the campaigns of Alexander but had never colonised nor transformed in their own image), that Islam, this new power and expansion, did a fatal thing: it introduced the Mongol: it opened the gates to a racial force of murder and destruction.

Intellectual Disease#

During the tenth century, at the end of what was for the West of Europe the Dark Ages (the generations when the Swabian German kings were wrangling for control of the Papacy, and when the Scandinavian pirates came so near to destroying our civilisation in northern Gaul and in Britain), Imperial Byzantium, the last heir of the Roman Empire, the last island of the ancient culture, passed through a period of military and political resurrection. It owed this to the vigorous character of its Macedonian emperors. These had not only stood up to the pressure of Islam on the eastern borders, they had found it possible to carry the counteroffensive into what had so long been Mohammedan territory. Christendom under their leadership pushed back Islam in spite of the successive waves of Turkish invasion. The Turks would raid into Byzantine territory in Asia Minor but never came near to establishing a permanent foothold—until one fatal day, the day of Manzikert.

A Byzantine counterattack upon Mohammedanism even reached halfway down the Syrian coast. There was a moment when it threatened Mesopotamia.

But the strength of this revival in the Christendom of the East, in the Christians of the Greek rite, was sapped by political intrigue at the centre. That political intrigue was mixed up with an “intellectual” disease comparable to the movement called today in Europe by the barbaric names of “Pacifism,” and “Anti-Militarism.” The coming into power of such politicians as batten upon movements of that kind undermined the whole new strength which the Macedonian Emperors had built up. The last fighting emperor could no longer be certain of proper support in the field against the Turk.

Battle of Manzikert#

It is not possible to say of any one action in history, “on this the fate of the world depended,” though certainly of each great critical action one can say that the future for generations to come was moulded by its results. What one can certainly say of Manzikert is that the remaining Greek and Christian civilisation received a mortal wound. The Mongols overran, devastated, and destroyed all that land of hither Asia which had been the solid foundation of the Byzantine power; the reservoir of Byzantine landed wealth, the nursery of our religion. The victorious Turks pillaged and killed wholesale. They overthrew permanent buildings wherever they went. They so cut at the roots of all civilisation that it withered before them. Within much less than a lifetime the whole vast district of interior Asia Minor was ruined. In such strongholds as remained Turkish garrisons and governors established themselves. The menace came to the gates of Constantinople.

Manzikert, the shock that launched the Crusade, would have destroyed us—but for the Crusade. Constantinople would have fallen; all Europe would have been involved—but under that stimulus the West moved. Gaul and the Rhine, Normandy, Flanders, Aquitaine, Lorraine armed, faced east, and went forward.

The Issue was the life or death of Christendom.

II: The Occassion#

Dieux Levolt#

Further the fruits of Manzikert were maturing. The Greek Island of high Christian civilisation, lying in immediate fear of death by violence, called in paid adventurers even from those westerners who were quarrelling with it and attempting its conquest also.

St. Gregory VII, the greatest of the popes, he who had in the midst of the century reorganised and restored the Church, had in the midst of his mortal anxieties and strains, dreamt of a universal Christian tide, swelling out through the Levant, and rescuing the Sacred Land. But the moment had not come. It came now ten years after Gregory’s death. But the man who continued Gregory’s work and confirmed the strength of the Papacy as Gregory had confirmed the structure of the Church, Urban II, ruled by no accident but with deliberate choice as of generalship. He gave the call.

The council had been summoned to Clermont to deal with very different things, largely with the condemnation of the King of France and his irregular divorce, more with the new details of ecclesiastical discipline. The abbots and bishops met there on November 18, 1095. For the first nine days not a word was heard of any matters other than those which the Great Assembly had been convened to debate. The tenth day of set purpose, Urban rose to preach, not to his fellows of the hierarchy, but to the huge crowds of knights, adventurers, and merchants, pilgrims and wandering folk, who filled the streets of Clermont. The story of what followed is famous. The loud cries of, God wills it! Dieux levolt!,were taken up, repeated, swelling from the multitude below, roused by that impassioned oratory from the man who was the chief of Christian men. It was this speech which made, in a moment, the Crusade. It made not the material, but it set the material afire; and the fire was lit deliberately by Pope Urban. It spread throughout the West and the air was filled with the name “Jerusalem.”

III: The Recruiting Field#

Understanding Christendom#

The society of Western Christendom in the eleventh century was something so different from anything we know today that unless we learn what it was, we cannot understand any of its activities, still less a major activity such as the Great Crusade.

To see how true this is let us imagine ourselves explaining modern Western Europe to a man of the late eleventh and early twelfth century. At the first sight of our modern condition he would be bewildered: “Where,” he would say, “is the unity of Christendom? What is all this about ‘Nations’? How are men got to work as craftsmen or on the soil without a communal village organisation? Where does authority lie and how is it divided?—and, above all, why do you go on as you do go on in a fashion so utterly different from ours? What are your spiritual motives?”

We should have to explain to him that there is no common religion in Europe today and, for the mass of men, no religion at all; that the only motives at work are economic, that the way by which labour is enforced from unwilling men is the capitalist system. We should have to explain how property has been taken away from the masses and these reduced to wage slavery, and yet how the wage slave is not as yet technically a slave, but nominally a citizen, free and equal with his wealthy masters. It would all seem to make nonsense in his ears no doubt, but with patience one might explain the major outlines of the thing.

We should have to show him how our society was organised; the moral authority of the national idea, the theory of uniformity and equality among citizens in spite of the enormous contrasts in wealth, the absolute sovereignty of each nation, the lack of any common authority over the various nations, the immense power which a modern government can exercise, especially if it be allied with the central financial forces at work in its chief city; still more if allied with international finance. We should have to show him how the thing looked from below: most of men not peasants constrained to labour by destitution, living under the terror of insufficiency and insecurity, and therefore better content with a secure wage slavery or with communism than with insecure freedom. We should have to show him how, in our society, expression on any useful scale is possible only through the possession of newspapers; how these are either controlled by a handful of men in a plutocracy, or by a handful of men in a despotism.

We should have to explain how production is today undertaken for profit. We should have to explain how this profit was got hold of by shareholders in companies and by banks which lend money (both real and imaginary) at usury and upon whom the whole economic structure depended: how shares in property were kept secret and at the same time were fluid, saleable, and purchaseable at a moment’s notice: how no stability in hereditary property remained.

Then we should have to explain how religion had ceased to be universal and corporate among us: the unhappy descendants of that Christendom which he took for granted, and in which he saw a common morality and worship strengthened by a growing centralisation under the age-long headship of the Western Patriarch who was also the universal religious chief, the pope. We should have to tell him how first, 400 years and more after his day, that unity had been broken by a religious revolution in which the corporate economy of the craftsmen disappeared and the already long-decaying village system disappeared with it. We should have to describe the gradual loss not only of common religious organisation but of all doctrine, until today, seven hundred years after his time, there remained but a special body still holding to full doctrine: around it various fragments of that doctrine being vaguely held as opinions, and a much larger mass by which the whole system of doctrine was forgotten.

With such an outline before him our eleventh-century Christian man might in some dim fashion guess gropingly at what we have become: he would understand the absence of spontaneous movements, he would understand how it is that although modern Europe boasts a number of large, highly organised armed forces, which are fully disciplined units, working each as one body, it is yet incapable of common action by two or more national armies combined. He would perhaps half understand our political chaos as flowing from our moral chaos; why what remains of Christendom is terrified at the approach of war but nonetheless advancing it.

A modern man trying to understand the Crusades must do the converse of all this. He will never understand their triumphs or their errors, least of all their failure, unless he has some vision of what the Western European world, the ground which today we call France, England, the Rhine-land, and Italy, meant to its inhabitants in the generations born between A.D. 1050 and A.D. 1070: men fighting in 1095-1100 when the hosts of the Great Crusade arose in a ground swell from Gaul and its adjacent lands, broke the old limits of the Dark Ages, surged forth foaming eastward, and for a moment submerged the Mohammedan world nearly cutting it in two, and all but destroying its vital communications. These great hosts sprang from a certain Recruiting Field—a district and a society whence such forces could be drawn.

Christian vs Non-Christian#

The recruiting field whence the hosts of the First Crusade were drawn was that part of Christendom which included Italy, the Rhine valley with its tributaries, the upper Danube, England, and Southern Scotland, France and the Netherlands, Scandinavia and the northern part of the Spanish Peninsula. We must exclude Ireland, because Ireland did not contribute to the First Crusade; but we cannot exclude any other district mentioned because, although very few mustered from outside Gaul, although the effort as a whole was Gallic (or we should say today “French”) yet it was neither consciously nor actually attached to Gaul as a district, still less to any precise idea of a French nation.

National differences were already in existence and were recorded; the Byzantines, for instance, remarked the volubility and quick emotions of the “Gauls.” When the native Saxon-speaking English appeared on the coast of Syria with their small contingent they were spoken of as something separate. But the ancient unity of the Roman Empire and of Christendom, its successor, was still too strong for provincial differentiation.

The great line of cleavage was between the Christian and the non-Christian. This is the main truth, and without a sense of it no man has an idea of the generations between A.D. 500 and A.D. 1000. No more grossly unhistorical error was ever propagated than that which reads into these times our modern preoccupations on language and on the more than half-imaginary thing called “race.” When Charlemagne raised his vast forces for the expansion of civilisation eastward to the Elbe and beyond, most of his men must have spoken one or another Latin dialect, a lesser number must have used various Germanic dialects—for his recruiting field was most unevenly divided between subjects of either speech. But no one troubled himself on such a point. The Christian, civilised man from around Cologne spoke German. So did the ruder pagan man from the heaths of the Oder, but they felt no bond between themselves. One was of the high imperial tradition, the other was an outer fellow whom it was the business of the first to tame, order, and instruct.

The German-speaking man from the eastern fringes of Charlemagne’s original realm, before the Saxon wars—from the Rhine—was brother and kin to the man from the wide central districts of the Seine, the Loire, and the Rhône. The man from Aix was of one main sort with the man from Rouen or Orleans or Narbonne; for they all had in common the same worship, the same manner of thought, the same culture, letters, permanent buildings, and laws, the same basis of Roman expression for everything that counted—codes of justice, record, liturgy, and above all, the Mass. As against that civilised traditional world the barbaric pagan of Scandinavia or the Elbe was repugnant: a thing to be resisted, overcome, and absorbed. That task had been accomplished long before the new awakening of Europe and the Crusading March. The world whom Urban so stirred had, for patriotism, an enthusiasm of religion, and for enemy, not an opposing realm, but the pagan and the Mohammedan.

Roman Catholic Emperor#

There was indeed, and had been for centuries, a second line of cleavage of less importance between the Oriental Christians who followed a Greek Liturgy in the Mass, and the Occidentals who followed a Latin Liturgy: between the Christians who still were or had been direct subjects of the Emperor at Constantinople, and the Christians of the West over whom he had nothing but very vague claims, whom he could not order in anything, and from whom for centuries he had drawn no revenue—though he still thought of himself as the Emperor of the whole Christian world and was in a very tenuous way still so regarded, even by those who never behaved as his subjects and though the West had a nominal “Emperor” of its own.

This Western recruiting field, of which much the most important part, furnishing perhaps nine tenths of the whole Crusading army, was Gallic, depended in all its social structure upon what had once been the united and active Roman Empire. It was still governed as to its eastern part by one authority acting from one capital city, and had been so governed in its western part also until nearly the end of the fifth century.

That western part was separate not only in Liturgy but in political arrangement. The chief personage in the West was no longer an Emperor. He had come to be an ecclesiastic, the bishop of Rome. The primacy of his See over the rest of Christendom had always been admitted in the East as well as the West, but as the united civilisation of Rome grew weak it acquired much stronger and more active power over its own western regions: North Italy and Gaul and Spain, Britain, the Rhine valley. What is called “the Medieval Papacy” existed in germ by the beginning of the fourth century, and was in active development by the sixth century. Mere custom had led to a difference in Liturgy between the East and West, not accompanied by any appreciable difference in doctrine, but the ecclesiastical authority in the West under the Pope of Rome had shaken off the civil authority of Constantinople three hundred years before the Crusade. The Emperor at Constantinople, affected by Mohammedan influence at his doors, had tried to enforce the destruction of images in the Italian churches and the cessation of liturgical service in connection with those images. Italy and the West had refused, and their refusal marked them off permanently from the Greek Eastern Christians.

But whereas the Greek East remained a centralised civil government under Constantinople, the Latin West under the Roman bishop had no central civil rule. The Western world, with its Latin Mass and the Pope as its centre of unity and moral authority, had fallen long ago into loosely divided districts, after the decaying central political authority (from before A.D. 500 onwards) could no longer collect taxes or appoint officials in the West as it still did in the East.

III: The Structure of the Crusading Forces#

Natural Organization#

It is very difficult for the modern man to envisage an armed force of that day, principally because the bond of discipline as we understand it was absent. There was organisation, and that organisation must have run throughout the whole great body, otherwise it could not have moved at all; but it was an organisation enforced on no rigid universal scheme such as controls a modern military instrument. The reason that the numbers melted away continually during the advance was not only because many were lost through famine and disease and desertion, but also through men’s preferring to attach themselves to this or that successful leader after each occupation of a post on the way to Jerusalem. Bohemond got Antioch, Baldwin of Flanders got Edessa; and to each successful head of the new colony (as we may call it) so many would come offering service, seeing an opportunity of betterment thereby.

Man’s Dominion Over Cavalry#

After the feudal structure of the first Crusading armies, proceeding from the social structure of our Western society in the late eleventh century, we must next appreciate the armament of these bodies.

In this department of armament the first thing the modern reader has to do is to see the thing in terms of cavalry—and it is not an easy thing for the modern reader to do that.

Our generation can still see cavalry as an auxiliary arm, though under conditions of mechanised warfare it is rapidly ceasing to be even that; but it requires a strong effort of imagination to visualise almost every decisive tactical movement as a movement of horse. Yet those were the conditions of Syria in the Crusading centuries. They had been the conditions of warfare throughout Europe and the Asiatic world for centuries before the Crusades, and were to remain so for centuries afterwards. The mounted man continually dismounted; he dismounted for siege work, and not infrequently for battle. But a mounted man he remained throughout. Warfare was conducted by the armed rider, whether of Islam or Christendom, whether French or Greek. Great masses of men on foot would accompany an armed force; though most of them as mere followers, some of them as servants, some used for special forms of attack and defence. Of those on the Christian side (not on the Mohammedan) the archer was a man on foot: but battles were won and lost by cavalry, and campaigns were conducted in terms of cavalry.

In the antique pagan world, the high civilisation of the Graeco-Roman period, it had been the other way about. Infantry had decided the issue. And with the original Greek states, as with. the early Roman state, the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion were both essentially infantry formations with cavalry only auxiliary and in comparatively small proportion. But at the time when the whole of the ancient world was changing, that is in the third century A.D., one of the main revolutions was the increasing preponderance of the mounted man in war. The main cause of this was the social degeneration which marked the last generations of paganism. All sorts of other causes have been imagined, and of course that worst of all bad history, the imaginary conquest of the Roman Empire by outer invading barbarians—a thing which never happened nor could have been within a thousand miles of happening—played its part in the group of false arguments. But, I repeat, the main cause is plain before one’s eyes for anyone to judge; cavalry became increasingly important as the discipline and coherence of society grew less.

A man on foot cannot stand up to a horse at a gallop or even at a fast trot; but an organised number of men on foot trained to stand together, held closely as one body by a firm discipline, can be got to withstand the threatening impact of such momentum. Give them projecting arms, such that the horse will flinch at the approach and the resistance of the footmen is easier; give them missile weapons which may check the horse at a distance, and it becomes easier still. In a high material civilisation even where the range of missile weapons is short, trained infantry can always be counted on to resist cavalry if the society from which it is recruited and officered has the same excellence in the military art as in others. But unless a sufficient degree both of cohesion and training be present, then in the absence of obstacles or missile weapons at long range, the horse will defeat the foot. And that is what happened as the society of the old Roman Mediterranean world began to change from within during that pivotal lifetime marked by the reign of Aurelian. A lifetime later, by A.D. 300 to 350, the horse had won, and cavalry remained supreme for more than a thousand years. The change took place, of course, within the framework of the Roman army, which became more and more barbaric in recruitment; but the barbarians as a body gave it no new military knowledge—in this as in all else they had everything to learn and nothing to teach.

IV: The Advance#

Norman Kings#

No one in Christendom affirmed the right of conquest by force over other Christians; that doctrine is a purely modern one invented since the Reformation. There was always in the old united Christendom, some pretext of right advanced for any contested claim; only in the case of victory over non-Christians could the victor simply take over the revenues of the vanquished.

Here in south Italy and Sicily the increasing Italian bands, led by a handful of Norman knights, could plead in moral support of their action that they were turning out the Infidel, the Mohammedan, who had got hold of Sicily and threatened to overrun the mainland. But at the same time they fought to get rid of the remnants of Greek government on the plea that the Greeks, single-handed, had not proved competent to the task of ousting the Saracen, and also on another, more confused ground, connected with the papacy.

The papacy had possessed for centuries great landed estates in those parts and especially in Sicily. The presence of the Saracens had largely cut off that revenue; the presence of the schismatic Greeks had also largely threatened it, for there was unceasing friction (varying from temporary reconciliations to open war) between the Eastern and the Latin communions. It was not thought arbitrary to attempt the inclusion of former Greek cities within the unity of the Western Church. A combined effort in which the pope, with the aid of German troops proposed the occupation of southern Italy, had clashed with the increasing power of the Norman adventurers; there had been a pitched battle, the Normans had won and the paradoxical result was that the papacy turned to rely upon this new force which it had just been fighting. The papacy gave legal status to the Norman efforts against the schismatical Eastern Christians, granted the first titles of government to the adventurers and their dependents, who became by formal deed the acknowledged feudal heads of Sicily and the southern Italian mainland. The masters of Sicily, though technically vassals of the pope, were henceforward called, on the authority of the pope, Kings. The name was adopted to show that they were independent of the Empire: that they had no lay, feudal, superior lord to whom they were accountable.

Memory of Manzikert#

The Emperor in Constantinople, Alexius, had two political objects of the first importance before him when this first great host came in sight. His chief object was, of course, to use these large bodies of Western men who would follow on, corps after corps, until their total would be five or six times as great as any Byzantine army yet gathered.

This matter of scale is of great importance to our understanding of the first Crusades. The loose Western armies of those adventurers were huge hordes in the eyes of the Greeks. The highly civilised Greeks had a strict military organisation, elaborate tactics, and had a whole school of strategy. To them the Western feudal levies with their lack of cohesion and learning seemed barbaric. The courage and still more the drive of the Western nobles impressed Byzantium, and most of all their numbers the like of which had not been seen in the East—even in the Moslem attack; but morally and intellectually Byzantium despised them.

Byzantine armies, regularly levied and carefully framed, were restricted even before Manzikert: they were lessened after it by the loss of the Anatolian recruiting field. Those vast numbers pouring in from the West, Alexius would use as allies and instruments for the recovery of the territories which the Greek Empire had so recently lost to the Infidel.

Manzikert, the initial disaster which had put all Asia Minor into the hands of the Turks, was still recent in the memory of all Byzantines not in their first youth; it was only 25 years since the Mongol hordes had overrun the provinces which gave Byzantium the bulk of its soldiers and the bulk of its revenue. There had been a later reaction, at least in the southern part of the lost territory, and when the first Crusaders arrived on the Sea of Marmora in the middle of December, 1096, it was only fifteen years since the southern provinces of Asia Minor had been recaptured by the Turks and only nine years since Edessa had been overrun; the bulwark of Christendom on the eastern borders of Asia Minor in the mountains of the upper Euphrates.

But the memory which was most vivid in Byzantine minds even perhaps more vivid than that of Manzikert, was the memory of Antioch. That town was still the great capital of Syria, it was still Christian, still full of traditions binding it to the Greek monarchy through centuries; still the symbol of Greek and Christian dominion upon the Mohammedan frontiers, when it had fallen to the Turks, only ten years before Pope Urban had preached at Clermont. It was barely eleven years that Antioch had been under the domination of a Moslem garrison when the Duke of Lorraine appeared upon the Bosphorus with his sixty thousand.

Clearly the main use the Emperor must make of such vast reinforcement—enormous in proportion to all that he could himself levy and arm—was the recovery of Antioch.

The bulk of the Crusaders were not marching with Antioch in view nor fixed as yet upon the occupation of any territory save that of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Antioch was on the way to the Holy Land; Syria would certainly fall more or less into the power of such allies; but still those allies might be persuaded to admit the ultimate sovereignty of the Byzantine Emperor should they recover Antioch and hold it of Alexius as his liege men, and he might feel himself re-established in something of the old majesty of those whom he succeeded on the imperial throne. The frontiers of Christendom would have been recovered, and though Greek dominion might at first be indirect, it would at least be legally admitted.

Deceptive Lure of Sea Power#

Thus the first very great and victorious march of the Crusade was made entirely by land save for the ferrying across the Bosphorus and the short crossing of the Straits of the Adriatic by but a portion of the Crusading armies. The rest of the work was foot slogging and horse mastership. It is remarkable that the one main Crusading effort, the earliest one, which was alone really successful, thus neglected, or was unable, to use, sea power. It is the more remarkable because the distances involved were so great. A manorial lord taking the Cross in lower Normandy as we know so many of them did—covered well over 2,500 miles first and last before he reached Jerusalem, if he had the good fortune to be among the few that did achieve that avowed object of their advance. A man from one of Godfrey’s central districts, say from Bouillon itself, in the Ardennes, covered perhaps some 200 miles less. Even the nearest group, the men from Sicily and southern Italy, covered well over 1,500 miles. The effort was greater than that of the Grand Army (in 1812) only the furthest units of which had marched near 1,500 miles before they reached Moscow; while the nearest units, drawn from the Napoleonic garrisons in Germany, covered only from 800 to 1,000 miles.

That the first successful effort was made by land while the later unsuccessful efforts were made in part by sea and at last mainly by sea is an illustration of something which you find running all through military history, to wit, that dependence upon sea power in military affairs is a lure, leading to ultimate disappointment. In the final and decisive main duels of history the party which begins with high sea power is defeated by the land power: whether that sea power be called Carthage, or Athens, or the Phoenician fleet of the great King, it loses in the long run; the land wins.

The point has often been discussed why this should be so, but at any rate so it is. Transport by sea, especially over great distances, has three glaring advantages: it is more rapid, it is less in danger (for those who are superior at sea), and it is far freer in choice of objective. The force commanding the sea can “switch off” from one plan to another; it can feint on widely distant points also. One might add a fourth advantage; sea transport is commonly less exhausting to the numbers and to the health of the advance.

Inaccuracy of Medieval Accuracy#

Let us ask, as the advance into Asia begins in this late spring of 1097, what true military effectives the leaders had at their disposal. It is unfortunate that we can only make an estimate within a very wide margin of error. In judging the military character of a campaign some estimate of trained numbers is essential, but for very few (even in the least documented times) have we less precise evidence than for this great expedition.

This is not due to the inaccuracy of medieval numbers as a whole. There is nothing commoner than accusing the Middle Ages of inaccuracy. The truth is that medieval numbers are either very precise when there is occasion to be precise, or else mere popular rumours and rhetorical statements. The latter can never be expected in any period to have statistical value save within wide limits of error. But for the former there is no period of the past for which we have so great a mass of exact and detailed numerical statement as for the Middle Ages. This is particularly true, for instance, in money matters. Accurate and detailed accounts were kept of which, for the later centuries at least, a large bulk has come down to us. But in the case of the First Crusade, as with so many of the medieval campaigns, a good basis for the judgment of total numbers is lacking. Some few of these campaigns do furnish reliable evidence; we have first-rate evidence, for instance, on the numbers just quoted as commanded by William in his invasion of England in 1066; a contemporary and a man who acted as his secretary, who witnessed the summoning of the host, gives us the figures. But for the numbers that mustered beyond the Bosphorus in April to May, 1097, we have to rely on vague, exaggerated rumour and inference.

…

We know how many more or less organised army corps there were following the main leaders: there were four, or, counting subdivisions, six. We know what a contemporary estimated to be Godfrey de Bouillon’s own section: 80,000 men. But we also know that that witness was a royal princess, with no good judgment in such matters.

…

The enemy accounts do not help us; they are purely rhetorical—for if Christian rumour in the early Middle Ages was vague, Moslem rumour was even vaguer.

…

But the best check on these vague estimates, with their vast limits of error (between a sixth and a third of a million) is the more precise evidence apparent towards the end of the march. You are then dealing with much smaller numbers, because the host has dwindled enormously through disease, hunger, thirst, casualties in action, and desertion. The Papal Legate, who was certainly accustomed to accounts and figures, tells us that there were in front of Antioch, after the terrible march through the ruined land of Asia Minor and after the deduction of the body which had gone off to Edessa, 100,000 fighting men.

Bad History#

After Heraclea (Eregli) there comes a change over the Crusading march. It takes on another character, and unless we understand how that change took place all the remainder of the movement, the occupation of Syria and the character of Latin Christendom in the Levant—the whole Crusading establishment as distinguished from the original advance—remains inexplicable. For after Eregli, the Crusading march, which had been almost wholly and directly a religious thing, becomes a thing political as well as religious. The chiefs of the Crusade, the great territorial princes, Tancred, the Count of Toulouse, Baldwin of Flanders, Godfrey’s younger brother—all of them except Godfrey himself—began to remember their private fortunes alongside with the recovery and holding of the Holy Sepulchre. They began to think of the Crusade as a feudal thing. They began to think of settlement, of revenue, of taking root after feudal fashion in the soil…

…

The crude explanation often given to this new character in the Crusade, which begins to show itself after Eregli, is to ascribe it to avarice. We are told that the great Western chieftains were incapable of agreement among themselves because each was grasping as much territory and revenue as possible, and that this swamped in them the Crusading spirit: that they had so far lost the soul of the great expedition, that they had destroyed its unity and made it impossible to attain the original objectives.

But to talk thus is bad history. The great feudal chiefs of the day acted as great feudal chiefs because they could act in no other fashion; they were of a feudal society, and the Western government they were to establish in the Levant could not have been established in any other fashion. They must recruit their revenues in order to carry on, they must hold territory in order to gather such revenue, and these territories must command and guarantee the approaches to Jerusalem by sea and by land.

Moreover, the wider the area the feudal western European class could master, the more was Islam weakened and the greater the chance of maintaining permanent mastery over the Holy Places. The feudal motive was mixed with the love of personal gain, but it is a misreading of the time to think that the love of gain was the driving power of these men. It had its place in their thought and actions, debasing Bohemond most and Godfrey of Bouillon least. The others in between were affected by it in varying degrees; but even Bohemond continued to the end a Crusader, and there was not one of them, not even Bohemond, who did not feel the inspiration of the Cross. The Christian name is perpetually invoked, it is the rescue of the Christian populations in the East which fills the story, and for the common purpose there is always to be discovered, in spite of fierce rivalries, a common action.

Nor did the Crusaders wreck their own effort. This loosely organised military society did, after all, take and hold Jerusalem, and triumphantly maintained, for nearly a century, the mastery of Christendom over the Holy Places. Bethlehem, Nazareth, the hills of Galilee, the Holy Lake, the shore of the waters which heard the predication of our Lord—all these were recovered from the Unbeliever. The Crusading effort failed at last, but it did not fail from being feudal; the European feudal system was a more solid thing than the Mohammedan world. The Crusading effort failed because distance and climate were too much for it, reinforcement too scanty and inferior.